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There are two commonly held views about racist and sexist humor, 
Wrong Telling: It’s wrong to tell racist or sexist jokes.
and
Racist/Sexist Laughing: Only a racist or sexist could ever 
find racist or sexist humor funny.1
In her “Humour, Belief, and Prejudice,” Robin Tapley (2012) draws on the 
work o f Hugh LaFollette and Niall Shanks (1993) to argue for something 
like Racist/Sexist Laughing. As she puts it in her conclusion:
Racist/racial, sexist/gender humour is funny because we think 
it’s true. We know the beliefs exist in the laugher, there’s no 
way to philosophically maneuver around that. (Tapley, 2012, 
p. 92)
While both Tapley and I believe Wrong Telling, I ’m unpersuaded by her 
arguments for Racist/Sexist Laughing, and in what follows I’ll be trying 
to do some philosophical maneuvering o f the sort that she thinks hopeless 
in the quote above.
Tapley contrasts her own view with the much more benign explana 
tion o f the person who laughs at a racist or sexist joke. According to the 
benign explanation, one can find such jokes funny by simply hypotheti 
cally holding (or imagining that one holds) the racist or sexist beliefs in 
question. Tapley argues that given our current understanding about how 
humor works, hypothetical or imagined belief cannot do the work needed 
to cause the ‘flickering’ that LaFollette and Shanks take to be characteristic 
o f humor.2 As they put it:
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The flickering essential for humor can only occur if the listener 
(or reader or viewer) believes that there is some point to the 
alternate belief patterns. That is, they must think that those 
patterns contain or imply some insight or “truth” about the 
persons, things or events in question. (LaFollette and Shanks,
1993, p. 334)
Since humor requires belief, and imagining that one has a belief isn’t like 
really having one, laughing at a racist joke can’t be explained by one’s 
merely imagining the associated racist beliefs. Tapley concludes from 
this:
Consider now that the joke is a racist or sexist joke and that the 
joke elicits laughter. I don’t think that there is any argument 
about the laugher sharing the beliefs expounded by the joke.
Given what we know about belief and stereotypes as prejudice, 
it seems that we can conclude that the laugher at the racist or 
sexist joke share the beliefs of the joke. That much we can de 
cide. There isn’t much point then to arguments that suggest we 
can “hypothetically hold” racist/sexist beliefs for the sake of the 
joke, or that we can imagine having certain beliefs for the sake 
of the joke. Such schemes would only allow us to “get” the 
joke, they would not allow us to find it funny, and laugh. Hy 
pothetically holding beliefs or imagining having beliefs would 
not meet the condition of a network of first order beliefs that 
were true in some sense -  a condition necessary to a person to 
be tickled enough to laugh. Hypothetical and imaginary beliefs 
cannot be true for a person. (Tapley, 2012, p. 91) I
I certainly won’t be defending the benign hypothetical/imaginatory expla 
nation o f racist/sexist humor here. This is largely because I don’t think 
that hypothetical belief is the most plausible alternative to belief when 
one comes to explaining humor. Rather than appealing to hypothetical or 
imaginary beliefs, we should be appealing to what Tamar Gendler (2008; 
2011) has recently referred to as aliefs.3
Aliefs are in many ways like beliefs. In particular, they can be as 
signed content, and in some ways can be used to explain our behavior. 
However, they are unlike beliefs in that they are not explicitly endorsed, 
and are not subject to the same degree o f rational control as our beliefs 
are. Indeed, aliefs can often be in conflict with our explicitly held beliefs, 
and our awareness o f this conflict does not lead to either the beliefs being 
revised or the aliefs going away.
For instance, the movie Jaws came out when I was about 10 years
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old, and while after seeing it I certainly didn’t believe that there was a 
large Great White Shark in my parent’s swimming pool (indeed, I knew 
that there wasn’t), there was something in my head that would periodi 
cally drive me (very quickly) out o f the pool. It wasn’t just imagining 
or entertaining the hypothesis that there was a shark in the pool, those 
wouldn’t have had nearly the same affect. This state that drove me out is 
an example o f what Gendler calls “alief.” If  I ’d believed that there were 
a shark in the pool, I simply wouldn’t have gone in, but my belief that the 
pool was shark-free kept me going in, while my alief that there was a shark 
coming for me kept me hopping out o f it.
Aliefs can explain, for instance, why we can enjoy scary movies (we 
have aliefs associated with the events occurring on screen, while if  we 
actually believed any o f this was happening, there would be no enjoyment 
associated with the experience). In much the same way, they explain why 
we have trouble eating food that is presented in the form associated with 
something disgusting. For instance, people have trouble eating chocolate 
putting formed into the shape o f a dog turd, and this trouble remains even 
if  they witness the creation o f the pudding and try out the pudding before 
it is put into the offensive form. They definitely believe that there is noth 
ing wrong with the pudding, but their aliefs keep them from enjoying it.
I think that aliefs are robust enough to explain the ‘flickering’ associ 
ated humor, since at some level o f cognition, there is something that is 
taking those aliefs to be true. The concept o f alief has only come to the 
forefront of philosophical consciousness in the last few years, so it is un 
surprising that LaFollette and Shanks would not have considered it when 
making up their theory in 1993, but had it been around, they might have 
taken it on board as well.
This is particularly so because the concept o f alief has been applied 
to explain precisely the sorts o f stereotypes that racist and sexist jokes ap 
peal to. The concept o f alief is useful in analyzing stereotypes because, 
contrary to Tapley’s claim that “Whatever stereotypes a person might have 
fit in with the rest o f their views” (Tapley, 2012, p. 90),4 there is fairly 
extensive evidence that stereotypes remain psychologically very real, and 
produce very real effects, even in those whose explicit belief directly con 
tradict the stereotypes. Indeed, it seems that mere awareness o f the stereo 
type can affect one’s behavior, whether one endorses it or not. As Gendler 
puts it:
knowledge of the stereotype -  as measured by the subjects abil 
ity and willingness to produce these terms when prompted to 
specify traits stereotypically associated with (American) blacks
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-  did not correlate in any ways with measures of explicit preju 
dice. Study after study has shown that “high- and low-prej 
udiced individuals d[o] not differ in theory knowledge of the 
stereotypes of Blacks but diverge sharply in their endorsement 
of the stereotype” ....
Moreover, awareness of the stereotype is sufficient to give 
rise to the relevant associative chains. The costs with which I 
will be concerned below are ones that arise simply from having 
encoded the stereotypes, whether or not the subject endorses 
them. (Gendler, 2011, p. 43)
Even among those who are explicitly and sincerely committed 
to anti-racism, the legacy of having lived in a society structured 
by hierarchical and hostile racial divisions retains its imprint.
So, for example, White participants primed with images of 
Black faces tend to be faster to identify an ambiguous image as 
a gun, and more likely to misidentify a (non-gun) tool as a gun.
(Gendler, 2011, p. 44)
If this is the case, it may be that merely being aware o f a stereotype, wheth 
er one believes it or not, could be enough to produce the alief needed to 
cause the ‘flickering’ needed to find a particular joke funny.
The resultant view isn’t that far, in many respects, from what Tapley 
defends when she writes: “We know that finding a joke funny rests on 
flickering between related but different belief sets. The beliefs in these 
states were formed not by voluntary choice, are considered true in some 
sense by the believer, and are agglomerated” (Tapley, 2012, p. 90). Aliefs 
are not formed by voluntary choice, and given their affect on action, there 
is clearly “some sense” in which they are considered true by the believer 
(though there is also a very good sense in which they are not considered 
true). The only real difference is that, unlike belief proper, they do not 
agglomerate, and agglomeration is not essential to explaining the humor 
involved. Indeed, the fact that they don’t agglomerate makes them well 
suited for producing the sorts o f inconsistencies required, so while Tapley 
(2012, p. 85) feels committed to insisting that “We don’t usually laugh at 
what we think is false or wrong,” the alief-based theory o f humor allows 
that we do often laugh at things we think are false.
Now even if all this gives one reason to reject Racist/Sexist Laughing,5 
it gives one even more reason to support Wrong Telling. If  it is aliefs rath 
er than beliefs that explain why a non-racist could find a racist joke funny, 
that makes the telling o f such jokes, if anything, worse. Telling such jokes 
teaches and re-enforces the stereotypes, and associated negative behavior 
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al traits, associated with them, and they have this effect even on those who 
don’t endorse the stereotypes at all. Socrates argued that the only real way 
to harm someone was to make their soul less just, and, arguably, telling 
racist or sexist jokes, by creating and reinforcing these action-generating 
associations, harms even the non-sexist non-racist listener in just this way.
Notes
1 Tapley starts her paper with the claim “The most popular question in the 
ethics of humor is whether or not laughing at a racist or sexist joke reveals the 
laugher to be racist or sexist” (Tapley, 2012, p. 85), and the gist of her paper seems 
to be that the answer to this question is “yes.”
2 I’ll just be taking for granted here that this explanation of humor works. 
One could, of course, argue against Tapley’s conclusions by denying her underly 
ing explanation of how humor works, but I’m more concerned to argue that even 
if one accepts the LaPhollette and Shanks story about how humor works, Racist/ 
Sexist Laughing doesn’t follow.
3 Some might wonder whether the types of cases that Gendler lumps under 
“alief’ really form a unified psychological kind, but nothing in the appeal to alief 
in this paper should rely on that assumption.
4 Lafollette and Shanks also suggest something like this in a note to the pas 
sage from p. 339 quoted above, where they say: “By ‘truth’ here we do not mean 
external everlasting or context-independent truth. Here we merely mean truth 
as compatibility with the person’s other beliefs. Something is capable of being 
humorous only if the new redescription is at least somewhat compatible with the 
listners’s beliefs -  even if those beliefs are false” (1993, p. 339).
5 Of course the denial of Racist/Sexist Laughing laughing wouldn’t mean 
that one should think that there was nothing wrong with laughing at a sexist or 
racist joke. Laughing at such jokes encourages the telling of them, so if telling 
them is wrong, one shouldn’t do things to encourage people who do. Still, while 
one shouldn’t laugh at such jokes if one can help it, if one can’t help it, it shouldn’t 
follow that one is a racist or sexist.
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